Adversarial Machine Learning And Speech Emotion Recognition: Utilizing
  Generative Adversarial Networks For Robustness by Latif, Siddique et al.
Adversarial Machine Learning And Speech Emotion
Recognition: Utilizing Generative Adversarial
Networks For Robustness
Siddique Latif1,2, Rajib Rana2, and Junaid Qadir1
1Information Technology University (ITU)-Punjab, Pakistan
2University of Southern Queensland, Australia
Abstract
Deep learning has undoubtedly offered tremendous improvements in the perfor-
mance of state-of-the-art speech emotion recognition (SER) systems. However,
recent research on adversarial examples poses enormous challenges on the robust-
ness of SER systems by showing the susceptibility of deep neural networks to
adversarial examples as they rely only on small and imperceptible perturbations.
In this study, we evaluate how adversarial examples can be used to attack SER
systems and propose the first black-box adversarial attack on SER systems. We also
explore potential defenses including adversarial training and generative adversarial
network (GAN) to enhance robustness. Experimental evaluations suggest various
interesting aspects of the effective utilization of adversarial examples useful for
achieving robustness for SER systems opening up opportunities for researchers to
further innovate in this space.
1 Introduction
Recent progress in machine learning (ML) is reinventing the future of intelligent systems enabling
plethora of speech controlled applications [1, 2, 3]. In particular, the emotion-aware systems are on
the rise. The breakthrough in deep learning is largely fueling the development of highly accurate and
robust emotion recognition systems [4, 5].
Despite the superior performance of deep neural networks (DNNs), recent studies demonstrate that
DNNs are highly vulnerable to the malicious attacks that use adversarial examples. Adversarial
examples are developed by malicious adversaries through the addition of unperceived perturbation
with the intention of eliciting wrong responses from ML models. These adversarial examples can
debilitate the performance of image recognition, object detection, and speech recognition models
[6]. Adversarial attacks can also be used to undermine the performance of speech-based emotion
recognition (SER) systems [7], putting security-sensitive paralinguistic applications of SER systems
at high risk.
In this paper, we aim to investigate the utility of adversarial examples to achieve robustness in speech
emotion classification to adversarial attacks. We consider a “black-box” attack that directly perturbs
speech utterances with small and imperceptible noises. The generated adversarial examples are
utilized within different schemes highlighting different aspects of robustness of SER systems. We
further propose a GAN-based defense for SER systems and show that it can better resits adversarial
examples compared to the previously proposed defense solutions such as adversarial training and
random noise addition.
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2 Background Literature and Motivation
Existing methods of adversarial attacks including fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [8], Jacobian-
based saliency map attack (JSMA) [9], DeepFool [10], and Carlini and Wagner attacks [11] compute
the perturbation noise based on the gradient of targeted output with respect to the input. This
is computed using backpropagation with the implicit assumption that the attacker has complete
knowledge of the network and its parameters (such methods are called white-box attacks). While the
backpropagation method, which needs to compute the derivative of each layer of the network with
respect to the input layers, can be efficiently applied in image recognition due to the differentiability
of all layers, the application of such methods is difficult for SER systems since these systems rely on
complex acoustic features of the input audio utterances—such as Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients
(MFCCs), spectrogram, extended Geneva Minimalistic Acoustic Parameter Set (eGeMAPS) [12].
The SER system’s first layer is the pre-processing or the feature extraction layer, which does not
offer an efficient way to compute derivative, therefore, gradient-based methods [9, 10, 11, 13] are not
directly applicable to SER systems.
Adversarial attacks on ML have provoked an active area of research that is focusing on understanding
the adversarial attack phenomenon [14] and on techniques that can make ML models robust [15].
For speech-based systems, Carlini [6] proposed a white-box iterative optimization-based attack for
DeepSpeech [16], a state-of-the-art speech-to-text model, with 100% success rate. Alzantot et al.
[17] proposed an adversarial attack on speech commands classification model by adding a small
random noise (background noise) to the audio files. They achieved 87% success without having
any information of the underlying model. Song et al. [18] proposed a mechanism that directly
attacks the microphone used for sensing voice data and showed that an adversary can exploit the
microphone’s non-linearity to control the targeted device with inaudible voice commands. Gong
et al. [7] presented an architecture to craft adversarial examples for computational paralinguistic
applications. They perturbed the raw audio file and were able to cause a significant reduction in
performance. Various other studies [19, 20, 21] have also developed adversarial attacks for speech
recognition system. However, most of the previous research on targeted attacks for speech-based
applications [6, 7, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21] has considered attacks on the model without investigating how
adversarial examples may be utilized to make the ML models more robust. Our work is different
since we not only propose an adversarial attack for SER system using adversarial examples but also
leverage adversarial examples for making ML models more robust.
3 Proposed Audio Adversarial Examples
In this work, we adopt a simple approach to prepare adversarial examples by adding imperceptible
noise (δ) to the legitimate samples. We take an audio utterance x with label y, and generate an
adversarial example x
′
= x+ δ such that the SER system fails to correctly classify the given input
while ensuring that x and x
′
are very similar when perceived by humans. Previous speech-related
studies have mostly considered “non-real world” random noise as adversarial noise. DolphinAttack
exploits inaudible ultrasounds as adversarial noise to control the victim device inconspicuously but
the attack sound was out of the human perception. Similarly, Alzantot et al. [17] used random
noise for creating an adversarial attack on speech recognition. It was however observed that the
state-of-the-art classifiers are relatively robust to random noise [14]. We therefore propose a black-box
attack for SER system where an adversary can add “real-world” noise as adversarial perturbation. We
empirically show that speech samples imputed with real-world noise can fool the classier while not
being perceptible to the human ear.
Generation of δ:
We use three noises: café, meeting, and station from the Demand Noise database [22] and their
imputation level is based on the already existing background noises (microphone noise and discussion
noise) in the utterances. We estimate the existing noise in utterances using a well-known technique
proposed in [23] that estimate noise using spectral and log-amplitude. We make the mean and
variance of the above three noises equal to that of the reference noise. We also use  as the variation
parameter to further control the extent of perturbation and added the perturbation noise δ to the
utterances using (xi +  × δi). Where xi is ith utterance and δi is generated noise for it. In this
way, the adversarial noise has a very small value similar to the existing noise and the adversarial
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Table 1: Binary class mapping of different emotions
Dataset Positive class Negative Class
IEMOCAP happiness, exited, neutral anger, sadness
FAU-AIBO neutral, motherese, and joyful angry, touchy, reprimanding, and emphatic
example is unrecognizable to the human ear in the human perception test. Because this noise acts as
the background noise it does not change the emotional context of a given audio file.
Human Perception and Classifier Test: In order to assess the effect of added adversarial noise
on the human listener, we asked five adults (age: 23-30 years) listeners to listen to 200 adversarial
examples for different perturbation factor () and differentiate it from the original audio file. For the
IEMOCAP and FAU-AIBO datasets, 96% and 91% of the samples were indistinguishable from the
original utterances. When these examples were given to the classifier, the attack success rate was
72% and 79% for IEMOCAP and FAU-AIBO, respectively.
4 Experimental Setup and Results
We evaluated the generated adversarial examples using two well-known emotional corpora: IEMO-
CAP and FAU-AIBO. We consider binary classification problem (Positive and Negative) by mapping
emotion to binary valance classes as used in [4] and [24]. Table 1 shows the considered emotions and
their binary class mapping for both these datasets. We use the eGeMAPS features, a popular features
set specifically suited for paralinguistic applications, for representing the audio samples.
Classification Model: We consider LSTM-RNN for emotion classification. LSTM is a popular
RNN and widely employed in audio [25] and emotion classification [5] due to their ability to model
contextual information. We find the best model structure by evaluating different number of layers.
We obtained the best results with two LSTM layers, one dense layer, and a softmax as the last layer.
We initially used a learning rate of 0.002 to start training the model and halved this rate after every 5
epochs if performance did not improve on the test set. This process stopped when the learning rate
reached below 0.00001.
Emotion Classification Results: For experimentation, we evaluated the model in a speaker inde-
pendent scheme. IEMOCAP dataset consists of five sessions; we used four session for training
and one for testing, consistent with the methodology of previous studies [4, 5]. For FAU-AIBO,
we followed the speaker-independent training strategy proposed in the 2009 Interspeech Emotion
Challenge [24]. For emotion classification on legitimate examples, we achieved 68.35% and 56.41%
unweighted accuracy (UA) on FAU-AIBO and IEMOCAP dataset, respectively. The results on
adversarial examples are compared with these results. We generated adversarial examples with
different values of  (0.1–2) to evaluate the performance of model with different perturbation factor.
This is demonstarted in Figure 1 presents the emotion classification error on adversarial samples with
different values of .
(a) (b)
Figure 1: The error rate (%) with different perturbation factors for speech emotion classification for
FAU-AIBO (left) and IEMOCAP (right) datasets.
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Based on Figure 1 the proposed attack is effective in fooling the classifier for emotion classification
tasks. With the perturbation factor 2.0, the classification error rate is increased from 31.65 and 43.59
to 56.87 and 66.87 for FAU-AIBO and IEMOCAP dataset respectively.
5 Defense Mechanisms
5.1 Training with Adversarial Examples
Adversarial training of model is considered as a possible defense to adversarial attacks when the
exact nature of the attack is known. Model training on the mixture of clean and adversarial examples
can somewhat help regularization [26]. Training on adversarial samples is different from data
augmentation methods that are performed based on the expected translations in test data. To the
best of our knowledge, adversarial training is not explored for SER systems and other speech/audio
classification systems. We explore this phenomenon by mixing adversarial examples with training
data to highlight the robustness of model against attack. We trained the model with training data
comprising of a varying percentage of adversarial examples (10% to 100% of training data). Figure
2 shows the classification error rate (%) significantly decreases with the increase of percentage of
adversarial examples in the training data.
(a) (b)
Figure 2: The error rate (%) with varying the percentage of adversarial samples as training data for
FAU-AIBO (left) and IEMOCAP (right) datasets.
5.2 Training with Random Noise
It is reported in [27] that the addition of a random noise layer to the neural network can prevent
strong gradient-based attacks in the image domain. We evaluated this phenomenon in speech emotion
classification system by adding a small random noise to overall training data and evaluated the
performance against the proposed attacks. Table 2 shows that emotion classification error reduces
only slightly with the addition of random noise in training data, which indicates that this strategy is
not particularly effective in the SER settings.
Table 2: Emotion classification error (%) while adding random noise in training data
Dataset Adversarial Perturbations Error (max) with adversarial attack Error by training with random noise
Café 56.87 54.02
FAU-AIBO Meeting 52.58 49.24
Station 53.57 48.51
Café 64.58 56.73
IEMOCAP Meeting 63.88 52.57
Station 66.87 60.87
5.3 Using Generative Adversarial Network
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) [28] are deep models that learn to generate samples, ideally
indistinguishable from the real data x, that are supposed to belong to an unknown data distribution,
pdata(x). GANs consist of two networks, a generator (G) and a discriminator (D). The generator
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network (G) maps latent vectors from some known prior pz to samples and discriminator tasked
to differentiate between the real sample x or fake G(z). Mathematically, this is represented by the
following optimization program:
min
G
max
D
Ex[log(D(x))] + Ey[log(1−D(G(z)))] (1)
where G and D play this game to fool each other using this min-max optimization program. In our
case, G network is tasked to remove the adversarial noise from the adversarial examples z. The G
network is structured like an autoencoder using LSTM layers. In the G network, the encoder part
compresses the contextual (emotional) information of the input speech features and the decoder uses
this representation for reconstruction. The D network follows the same encoder-decoder architecture.
For training G and D for different possible scenarios, we used the training data from both the datasets
to train the GAN. For each G step, the discriminator was updated twice. For faster convergence, we
pretrained the G network in each case. We trained GAN using RMSProp optimizer with learning rate
1× 10−4 and batch size of 32, until convergence. For training we used utterances corrupted by the
three adversarial noises: café, meeting, station as noisy data and it was tasked to clean the utterances.
Data cleaned by GAN was given to the classifier for emotion classification.
Table 3 shows emotion classification results on audio utterances cleaned by GAN. It can be noted
that the classification error significantly reduces by removing adversarial noise from data prior to
classification.
Table 3: Emotion classification error (%) by utilizing GAN as defense against adversarial noise
removal
Dataset Adversarial Perturbations Error (max) with adversarial attack Error by employing GANprior to classification
Café 68.82 38.31
FAU-AIBO Meeting 62.58 36.02
Station 66.87 35.14
Café 65.87 49.20
IEMOCAP Meeting 67.70 48.18
Station 69.87 46.24
6 Discussion
From the experimental evaluations we find that GAN-based defense against adversarial audio ex-
amples better withstands adversarial examples compared to other approaches. Figure 3 shows a
comparison of the different defense mechanisms using two well-known datasets: IEMOCAP and
FAU-AIBO. The addition of random noise in training utterances slightly reduces speech emotion
classification error, however, using adversarial training, classification error is significantly reduced.
This supports that training with random noise is not adequate to avoid adversarial attacks. The
(a) (b)
Figure 3: The error rate (%) with three different approaches against adversarial examples for FAU-
AIBO (left) and IEMOCAP (right) datasets.
best results are however achieved using GAN. This motivates further research for its utilization in
other speech-based intelligent systems for the minimization of adversarial perturbations. It is worth
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pointing out that GANs require information about the exact type and nature of adversarial examples
for its training, but this is also an essential requirement for the adversarial training mechanism.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a black-box method to generate adversarial perturbations in audio examples
of speech emotion recognition system (SER). We also propose a defence strategy using Generative
Adversarial Network (GAN) for enhancing the robustness of SER system by first cleaning the
perturbed utterances through GANs and then running a classifier on it. We compared our GAN-based
defense against adversarial training and the addition of random noise in training examples and showed
that our GAN-based defense provides consistently better results in speech emotion recognition. We
anticipate that the attack and defense that we propose can also be utilized more generally for other
speech-based intelligent systems.
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